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ABSTRACT
Historical surveys of consumer credit in the United Kingdom identif, rhe
importance oFcheck trading without documenting its magnitude or devel-
opment. Check traders provided promissory notes redeemable with local re-
tailers, who paid discounts in return lor the custom. J'he Provident Clothing
and Supply Company establ ished the system in 1880 and by 1910 had ob-
tained an annual turnover of 
€1,000,000. Checks were used ro purchase
goods at what Provident argued were "ordinary retail prices." While critics
claimed the system olfered poor credit bargains check trading remained un-
regulatccl. Using Provident's records the paper ollers a uniqtre opporruniry ro
assess the sizc and nature olt an institution central to many working class
budgets.
Introduction
The contribution of credit to the growth of consumer sociery in the United King-
dom is widely acknowledged.2 Credit expanded enormously from the late nineteenth
century to satisfy new wants and methods of lending evolved to help facilitate borrow-
ing. The best-known innovation was installment sales via hire purchase (HP), the devel-
opment and impact of which has been widely explored.r Rising rwenry-fold in the early
'Iwentieth Century, HP was believed to accounr for about 2.5o/o of rctal personal expen-
diture by the late 1930s." Other modes of credit found favor among those excluded from
HP In other cases they were used to buy less expensive items such as clothing or drapery,
while HP was reserved for more expensive goods. Tallymen or Scotch drapers found new
urban markets after centuries of providing cheap drapery to rural customers on credit.s
Mail order retailers successfully attracted customers with deferred rerms.6 Pawnbrokers
and moneylenders continued to service the most financially excluded.?
One major credit innovation remains unexplored beyond brief assessments by Melanie
Tebbutt, Paul Johnson and Avram Thylor.s Check trading was pioneered by the Provi-
dent Clothing and Supply Company (hereafter Provident). Checks quickly became inte-
gral to many working class family budgets. Unlike other forms of credit, check rrading
was not subject to parliamentary debate or legislation for the greater parr of irs history.
Consequently, its magnitude and imporrance was poorly understood before the 1957
Census of Distribution. This study analyzes Providentt development berween the 1920s
and 1960s. Since Provident dominated this trade, its business provides an insight into
the entire sector.
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This paper commences by contextualizing the working class credit market before
outlining Providentt relations with customers and retailers. The role of agents and the
costs and benefits of the system for consumers are then examined in greater detail. W'e
then consider contemporary critiques of the trade, questioning the relative absence of
regulation in an era that saw moneylenders and HP financiers increasingly constrained.
The paper concludes by weighing check trading against other modes of credit used by
working class households. In this respect the conclusions are g€rmane to conrinuing
debates about the costs of credit for low-income consumers. Provident Financial Pl,C, as
it is known today, now operates as a moneylender and is regularly admonished for "preda-
tory lending." lt continues to attract large numbers of working class customers, jusr as it
has done throughout its history.
The Origins and Organization of Check Tiading
The use of credit by working class families in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain
was heavily influenced by legal and moral arguments about their indebtedness. Fears of
delinquent borrowing were fanned by the increasing use of the Counry Courts ro recover
small  debts, which heard 1.4 mil l ion cases in 1904 alone.e "Fringe capital ists," such as
tallymen, were regular subjects of judicial criticism.r0 The credit trade attempted to skirt
potentially damaging paternalistic antagonism: the adoption of suitably prudent com-
pany names and mottos offering one lir-re of defense."
According to the Provident, it was in this climate that Joshua K. Waddilove, Meth-
odist lay preacher and industr ial insurance agent, founded the company in 1880.
tVaddilove noted the high prices Bradfordk working class women paid tallymen for infe-
rior goods. Tallymen specialized in door-to-door selling, offering goods on credit in cash-
limited neighborhoods.rr Company publications claim that Waddilove initially donated
promissory notes for redemption at local shops. As other wom€n approached him with
offers of weekly payment for use of his "checks," W'addilove recruited agents and estab-
lished a club to facilitate the business.ri In return for the extra cusrom Waddilove dis-
counted checks presented by retailers.ra In combaring its critics the company empha-
sized the philanthropic motives said to underly its foundation alongside tX/addilove's
religious associations and the many benevolent acts that led to his receipt of a knight-
hood in  1919.
Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of the Provident system, showir.rg the
circulation of checks and the reciprocal exchange of goods and payments.rt Provident
issued checks For distribution to "respectabie" (i.e. credirworthy) cusromers by agents.
Agents recruiting new customers received a bonus, although most borrowing was recur-
rent. Customers paid the first weekly installment to secure the release of the check -
genera l l y  va lued a t  sums o f  l0  sh i l l i ngs  ( .€0 .50) , .€1 ,30  sh i l l i ngs  ( f l .50)  and.€2  and
upwardsr6 plus a fee or "poundage" which paid for the agent's services. Provident
required no collateral and, unlike HP financiers, was unable to repossess goods ro recoup
outstanding debts. Agents collected repayments from the customers' home each week at
the rate of 1 shilling per pound. Although checks were nominally repayable over r\rvenry
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weeks, most customers took longer. In 1938, Provident claimed that repayments nor-
mally took berween 24 a.nd 26 weeks, while thirry years later the National Checktaders'
Federatior-r told Lord Crowther's Cornmittee on Consumer Credit that repayment aver-
aged 25 weels. r- Late payment was not penalized; a strong consideration for those oper-
ating on tightly balanced weekly budgets.
Figure 1: Synoptic Model oF the Provident System
---------------) Flow of Checks
> Reciprocal excharge ofgoods and payments
Checks allowed customers to buy goods at what Provident claimed were "ordinary
retail prices."rs The largest check trading companies offered lengthy lists of participating
retailers.re Grar.rt suggested that clothing, foorwear, bedding and kitcher.r utensils were
the most common purchasest", but customers could also buy almost anything with the
exception of food and drink. Checks ofTered working class shoppers a degree of retail
mobility often unavailable via other modes of credit. tVhereas mail order catalogues,
credit drapers or even co-operative stores attempted to monopolize their customers, check
shoppers could move beween establ ishments and conpare prices. Retai lers were in-
structed to endorse the amount spent in their shop on the back of the check so thar
customers could take outstanding balar-rces elsewhere or defer consllmption. Check trad-
ers argued that credit retailers and mail order companies charged "high prices for inferior
goods .. .  to cover their r isks,"rr while their customers paid no more than cash shop-
pers.I Thus, in 1910, the company confidently declared that i t  oFFered "the best and
most popular credit system evcr devised.":r
The circuit of credit was completed when retailers presented checks for redemption.
Provident's discount averaged 16.50/o prior to the Second World War2r , falling to abour
12o/o by its end.rt Retailers submitted :rccounts monthly but could wait rwo months for
payment.26 Although discounts generated some conflict check trading offered shopkeep-
ers several advantages. Check traders relieved retailers from canvassir-rg for business,
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screened customers' crediworthiness and bore bad debts. Check holders, Provident ar-
gued, would eventually become cash customers or use checks in parr paymenr for more
expensive items. These advantages were seductive to some retailers: by the late 1930s
Provident had agreements with 14,000 retailers, rising to 20,000 by the early l960s.r:
However, as Tebbutt suggests, many retailers were drawn into the system because of the
growing acceptance of credit arnongst consumers between the wars.ls
Scale and Scope 1925-60
Although little was knowt.t about the scale and scope of check tradir.rg before the
1957 Census of Distribution, Provident's dominance of the trade was well ur.rderstood.
The extent of Providentt market between the mid-1920s and the early-1960s is indi-
cated by the average number of cusromers per annum berwee n 1925 and I 960 shown in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Average Number of Provident Customers 1925-1960
Source: PFC/04/051: Surrmary of Rcturns.
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Provident recorded approximately 637,000 cusromers in 1925. \7e cannot be sure
oFhow this con.rpares with numbers befbre 1914, but the fivefold growth of collections
benveen 1910 and 1925 is indicative of a substantial increase.r') However, it appears that
Provider.rt 's market had become satiated at about 1.1 mil l ion cusromers by the late- 1930s,
although it is uncertait.t whether the war curtailed further growrh. A similar pattern of
growth is observable afier the war, the number of customers reaching its ceiling ar more
or less pre-war levels by the mid-1950s, suggesting that Provident appeaied to a large but
limited m:rrket. lt is unlikely that there was a high turnover among Provident's cusrorll-
ers. Contemporaries, notably the Vomen's Group on Public Welfare, expressed concern
about cttstomer's long-run dependence on checks. j" Provident acknowledged the lor-r-
geviry of many agreements. In i938, when outlining why check trading should be ex-
cluded from the Hire Pr-rrchase Bill, the conpany argued that it had retained many cus-
tomers for over thirty years. This, it argr"red, was not a sign of desperarion: many cllsrom-
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ers could buy goods without credit but preferred to reserve cash for other purposes.'fhis
precautionary argument was supported by research for the Economist Intelligence Unit
in  7964. \ )
Figure 3: Renewals and New Business 1925-1960
Source:  PFG/0/4051: Surnm:rry of  Returns;  C.H. Feinstein,  Stat is t ical
Trbles of National Income, Expenditr-rre and C)utpur of the U.K. 1855-
19(r1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), T22.
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A similar pattern of growth and market satiat ion is observable with respect to
Provident's le nding, showr.r in Figure 3 at constant 1l960 prices. I Real lending fell dur-
ing the late 1l920s, undoubtedly due to worsening economic circumstances and indus-
tr ial  unrest, but grew modestly in the l930s.rr Provident, along with other non-bank
lenders, had to deal sympathetically with customers affected by unemployment or sick-
ness, and the company recorded high payment arrears in many depressed communiries.
Lending recovered quickly after \)/orld \X/ar Two before slowing again during the 1950s.
Provident's lending can be decornposed into new business and renervals - the issue of
new checks to existing cllstomers. Figure 3 reveals the importance of renewals. However,
the long-term customer's dependence upon Provident was mutual. Lengthy repaymenr
schedules resulted in high levels of outstanding debt, averaging some 43o/o of the value of
credit isstred between 1925 and 1960. Nonetheless, Provider.rt  did not encounter l iquid-
iry constraints; the confidence ofits financiers was predicated on low levels ofbad debt
that i ts chairm:rn supposed "would certainly not be bel ieved by any of our competi-
tors.
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Figure 4: Full and Part-Time Agents and Number of Districts 1925-60
Source: PFG/0/4051: Summary of Returns.
Evidence of Provident's efforts to conduct its business may be gleaned from the
number of ager.rts and district offices.rt As Figure 4 demonstrates, Provident depended
upon part-time agents benveen the wars. Average numbers of part-time and full-time
agents employed each quarter benveen 1925 and 1939 both expanded by some 6.30/o per
annum. This greatiy exceeded the growth of customers and real lending, indicating the
increasing effort required to recruit and retain customers. However, since agents were
primarily remunerated via poundage, the company did not bear the full costs of any
inefficiency. Post-war figures indicate a change in Provident's personnel as the growth in
full-time agents greatly exceeded that of parr-timers, rhe former comprising nearly half
the field workforce by 1960. As evidence from other credit traders reveals, rising poswar
labor costs made it increasingly difficult to recruit part-time collectors.r(' Opposing trends
in the numbers of customers and agents ensured that lending per agent declined benveen
the mid- to late-1950s.
Provident's expanding network of offices also casts some light on rhe company's
expansion and dispersion. Unlike nlany other check trading operarions, such as the paro-
chial Practical Clothing and Supply Company Limited founded in the Lancashire town
of St Helens in 1910r-, Provident quickly established a national presence, establishing
some I 25 districts before tWorld tWar One.rs OF these, only one-third were located in the
Yorkshire and Humberside and North West regions, with nearly one-fifth situated in the
South East and a further one sixth in lreland, Scotland and Vales.s') The neworkt growrh
in the 1920s was modest, reflecting that decade's economic uncertainry. Howeveq the
I 930s saw the company open 724 new district offices and extend its network throughout
the British Isles. The 1930s represented the height of the neworkt expansion: the com-
pany opened a further 47 offices up to 1960 but also closed 39 districts. Archive infor-
mation or.r districts is limited, but it is possible to derive some information on the re-
gional distribution of districts and their share of the business for a sample of 261 districts
during 1949, detai ls of which are given in Table l .a0
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Table 1: Reqional Distribution ofDistricts and Custotners in 1949
Resion
Pacentof Pcrcenlof
Districts Customsrs
North
North West
Yorkshirc & Hmberside
West Midlands
East Midlands
East krglia
South East
South Wesl
Scorland
Wales
Irelandt
l 5
45
23
l 8
7
65
2 6
o
< 7
t7.2
8.8
9.2
6.9
249
10.0
6.5
2 . 3
I  J . J
8.7
6.5
9 .1
2.8
32.7
1 t
9.9
8.7
) A
Total 261
r Includes Norlhern lreland and the Republic oflrcland
Source: PFO/04101 1 : Field Orsanization
Though check trading began in the north of England it built significant markets in
Scotland, Wales ar.rd South East England. The South East had a quarter of the company's
district offices and one-third of its customers in 1949. Of the offices opened between the
wars, approximately one-third were located in the South East, suggesting that Provident
carefully mirrored the population's drift from the North to the South East, most notably
in the 1950s when nearly half the new districts established by Provident were located in
this region. New offices in Basildon, Harlow and other "new" towns accommodated the
migration of working class Londoners.
The Social Relations of Check Tiading
Check trading was conditioned by economic, social and cultural factors. Its conduct
was dictated by the persistence of asymmetric information and the desire to avoid regu-
lation. Along with other lenders check traders knew less than borrowers about their
ability and willingness to repay debts. Hence, they faced the classic problems of adverse
selection (attraction of bad debtors) and moral hazard (risk of default). Normally lenders
aim to limit defauit by requiring that borrowers offer collateral or forfeit goods. How-
ever, these options were not available to Provident. Consequently, its principal defense
against loss was eflective credit screening and debt collection.
Agents fulfilled three key tasks: they recruited customers, established their credit-
worthiness and collected payment. Agents were recruited by canvassing, advertisements
or from existing customers. The collective experience of agents and their managers was
assembled in Herbert \febb's 1929 company manual, throughout which Providentt aver-
sion to risky lending and debt recovery through the courts is ingrained.at Agents held a
great responsibiliry not least because theywere collecting an average of some.€600,000
per week in cash by 1960.4'   The company was clearly aware of the potential moral
hazards inherent within the system. Agents satisfied with their incomes might not strive
to find new customers or, having received their poundage, vigorously pursue bad debts.
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Joshua Waddilove's original instructions anticipated these problems. Full-time agents
incapable of recruiting for two successive weeks (four weeks for parr-time agents) would
be dismissed. Similarly, those failing to collect 75o/o of rheir weekly total faced stringent
investigation.ar tWebb advised managers not to rolerate any "slacking off," advising them
to fire inadequate agents and train and motivate the merely inefficient.aa In any evenr, as
Chairman VictorVaddilove pointed out in a 1935 circular, a regular turnover of agenrs
was potentially advantageous if well managed, since each recruit was a porenrial source of
new business.i5
As Vaddilove suggested, local knowledge and contacts were vital in recruiting cus-
tomers. Even those who recruited few customers before leaving the business were valued,
since customers were invariably retained after the agent's departure.a(' Mail order compa-
nies benefited from a similar system, using vast armies of largely female part-time agents
who received small conrmissions for selling items from catalogues displayed to family,
neighbors ar.rd fellow workers. The 7927 Moneylenders Act removed this possibility from
licensed moneylenders who were prohibited From canvassing door-to-door. Howeveq
discretion was essential in successfully canvassing working class neighborhoods. In 1929
Providentt staff were advised as foliows: "lf the street is flooded with canvassers, people
are apt to be shy ofletting their neighbors know oftheir desire to take credit. Ifthey do,
they prefer to think that it is unknown to the outside world."1' Although unpopular
with agents, regular canvassing was essenrial to build up trade. Although Provident pre-
ferred canvassing to press advertising, because ofthe cost and the opportunity ro empha-
size i ts reputation direct ly, i t  noted ir .r  the late-1920s that smaller comperirors made
greater use of local newspapers.ls
Once recruited, agents screened potential customers' creditworthiness. In the ab-
sence of collateral, Providentt key means for verilying an abiliry and willingness ro pay
were home visits, informal ir.rquiries and testing. Besides furnishing information on in-
come and consumption, home visits allowed age nts to evaluate the borrowert position in
the family life cycle.{') Information gleaned from neighbors and local retailers helped
corroborate or refute claims about patrerns of consumption and employmenr. If cusrom-
ers passed this scrutiny their reliabiliry would be tested by a small initial check, increasing
in value if repayment was satisfactory. Home collection imposed an important discipline
upon borrowers.50 This, according to W'ebb, was only possible if agents were similarly
disciplined. Collection should coincide with paymenr of wages and be regular ro av€rr
opportunities for missed payments. Recalcitrant payers might require the "right word or
hint" or a "straight talk," while the most diFficult customers warranted "exrensive pres-
sure on visi ts," the withdrawal of credit  being the ult imate sancrion.5r These methods
proved highly effective and helped minimize scruriny of the business.
But Providents abiliry to discipline cusromers was limited by its dependence upon
recurrent lending. As with other forms oF credit5r, customers were aware that missed
payments might jeopardize ftrture borrowing. However, as Rowlingson's analysis of mod-
ern moneylending emphasizes, borrowers can exploit the lender'.s dependency to extracr
more favorable terms|: giver-r fixed nominal repaymenr, extending the loant term effec-
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tively reduces the annual percentage rate of interest (APR) payable. Provident'.s inabiliry
to impose penalry charges tacitiy recognized the limits of its authority, although it pub-
licly presented necessiry as a virtue. However, borrowers could only negotiate the terms
of trade at the margin before exclusion from the system ensued.
Bouthard notes that credit and debt are wrongly used interchangeably.5' This may
be so, but oral testimony reveals that credit and indebtedness were closely identified with
a lapse in respectability.t5 Certainly, working class families on low and/or uneven rn-
comes encountered significant difficulties in making purchases beyond those possible
within weekly budgets. But as Johnson notes, the significance of credit wenr far beyond
the accumulation of goods: credit helped "preserve a familyt status by prevenring a fall
into public destitution, or to elevate it by permitting an accumulation of additional
goods or services."s6 Interestingly, it appears Provident checks were ofren not seen as
credit in the conventional sense due to the personal relationship with the agent and the
prospect of paying "cash prices" for a small fixed charge. Furthermore paymenrs could be
informally suspended to divert money towards more pressing needs. Goods purchased
with checks could also be pawned in emergencies to raise cash.57 On other occasions
checks were bought and immediately sold at a discount to neighbors, or even the agent.
The Economist Intelligence Units 1964 report noted that some more affluent cusromers
used checks "as a kind ofsavings insurance."is
Provident strongly promulgated the view that it operated in the customert interesr
and rejected accusations that it locked customers into exploitative relationships. In par-
ticular it contested claims that customers did not fullv comorehend the true costs of the
system:
The working class population are not simple uninrelligent people who, ur
some way or other have been induced to adopt fbr some 60 years, a system of
trading which they do not nced and which is not to their advantage ... Thcy
fully understand thc syster.r.r and know exactly what they have to pay.i''
If consumers made a rational decision to use Provident's services, then they did so
in light of the alternatives available. These were limited for many working class families.
Hire purchase was one alternative, and \ii/right suggested that HP and checks were "mildly
complementary'' in the 1950s, as consumers with HP commitments used checks to buy
clothing and household goods.t"' However, HP was impractical fbr many Provident cus-
tomers since the goods they wished to purchase were ir.rsufficiently valuable or durable to
justily a HP agreement. Mail order was attractive since it also operated via agency and
also of{:ered weekly terms. Provident warned customers against catalogue retailers but
many households evidently used both types of credit.('r
'I'he 
co-operative movement's mutuality clubs offered the n-rost direct competition
to the check trade. Established in the I 920s, they had an annual turnover ofaround f40
million in 1957, rwo-thirds that of the independent check traders. They charged compa-
rable collection fees but could offer guarantees about the equivalence ofcheck and cash
prices. Furthermore all purchases were eligible for the quarterly dividend paid to society
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members, thereby reducing the effective cost of credit.(" However, these clubs imposed
certain restrictions: they only extended credit to members with healthy balances with the
society and spending was limited to co-operative stores. More importanrly, it was neces-
sary to clear outstanding debts each quarter to qualifi, for the dividend. Mutuality clubs
clearly reduced the overall potential scale of the check rrade, but were nor a perfecr
substitute for many consumers. Other alternatives also tied the customer to pamicularly
retailers. In the North East of England ticket schemes operated by departmenr srores
such as Parrishes of Newcastle-upon-Tyne had many of the feature of che ck trading but
were only available for use in the one shop.('] Elsewhere thousands of small to medium
sized retailers operated weekly payment schemes that also tied customers to rheir opera-
tions. That none of these schemes was looked upon as favorably as the Provident system
is evidenced by the secondary market in credit. This consisted of cusromers who sold
their checks or tickets to a third party at a discount to raise cash. k appears that Provident
checks were always the most highly commodiry in this market because of their portabil-
ity."a Finally, consumers could also use pawnbrokers and conventional moneylenders,
although they appear to have been used as a lender of last resort. However, most working
class families in the first half of the rvventieth cenrury had some experience of the pawn-
broker (and perhaps the moneylender also) as they experienced the vagaries of the life
cycle, the trade cycle, illnesses, births, deaths and marriages.
Provident was sensitive to allegations that shopkeepers covertly raised prices for check
customers or sold inferior goods to cover rhe discount, such as those published by the
Daily Express in 1938.65 Contracts with retailers, it claimed in a memorandum submit-
ted during the reading of the Hire Purchase Bill, prohibited price discrimination againsr
check customers: establishments guilry of this offence faced ejection from the scheme.
Provider.rt argued that complaints had been negligible.66 Howeveq the same memoran-
dum teliingly revealed anxiety and unease about overcharging:
He [the custorner] is advised not to produce his check until after rhe rransac-
tion is complcted so that even if a shopkeeper was tempted to increase the
price in order to meet the discount ... he is not given the opportuniry of
doing so.6-
Provident's agreement, though, did not prohibit retailers from charging high prices
for all classes of customer or stocking goods inferior ro rhose cash-only stores might
supply. In an era when consumers received little statutory protection many retaiiers un-
doubtedly acted opportunistically in either (or both) respecrs.
Crit ics and Regulat ion
One unusual feature of the check trade was the comparative lack of criticism it
attracted together with the almost complere absence of reguiation prior to World Var
Two. This was not true of all forms of working class credit. Moneylending had been
subjected to r igorous parl iamentary debate during the course ofthe 1900, 1911 and
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1927 Moneylending Acts. Cour.rry Court judges, social worke rs, the press and politicians
had formed a consensus regarding the abuses of HP by the 1930s, culminating in the
1938 Hire Purchase Act.6B This is not to imply that check trading was without critics. As
Judge Frankland opined during correspondence on the 1938 Act: 
"Please do not think
that companies such as the Provident (ironic designation) are in any way eleemosynary,"
arguing that the company realized a gross profit in excess of 20o/o or"r its lending.('e How-
ever, given the expense of maintaining a vast army of agents, managers and clerical work-
ers net profits were closer to 5-7o/o of turnover in the mid-1930s.;0
Check trading, along with forms of working class credit, attracted criticism due to
its costliness and tendency to lock borrowers into indebtedness. Critics claimed lenders
exploited financial exclusion and lack of competition to charge socially harmful interest
rates. The most prominent and influential critique came in Our Towns. "Inferior rypes of
clothing club" (i.e. check trading) were among the nine most wasteful expenditures by
working class households.'1 Poundage and retailers' discounts were highlighted as the
systemt major defects. Were Provident's charges extortionate? Poundage at the pre-war
rate is equivalent to an APR of approximately 23.3o/o. Although more expensive than
bank loans, this was significantly lower than the interest paid to licensed moneylenders,
which had been set at a m:rximum of 48o/o 6y the 1927 Moneylenders Act. Howeveq the
comparison looks less favorable when we consider the full amount extracted from work-
ing class communities: Our',|-owns suggested that consumers received goods valued at as
l i t t le as 16 shi l l ings and 6 pence per pound for the cost of 21 shi l l ings.T2 These goods, i t
continued, might well be inferior, such as "shoes with compressed cardboard soles, cot-
ton blankets [and] kiddies'blazer suits ofvery inferior flannel."7r In contrast, co-opera-
tive n.rutuality clubs were commended as a "genuine effort" to help working class fami-
l l e s -
Given public anxiery surrounding credit, why did check trading fortuitously evade
regulation? One possible explanation lies in the Crowther Committeet observation that
check trading existed in "a sort of legal limbo" -companies were nor moneylenders
since they only issued promissory notes and did not make any claim to goods as did HP
financiers.r5 But legal ambiguiry was the consequence of a lack of regulation and does
not explain either the cause or persistence of this privileged status. The most plausible
explanation is that, unlike moneylenders and HP companies, check traders and their
customers avoided the courts. McManus'.s argument concerning the origins of the 1938
Hire Purchase Act is instructive in this respect. McManus suggests that social pressures
and the operation of the courts were crucial in shaping subsequent legislation.-6 While
grievances of the poorest users of HP attracted little attention, those of middle class
clients more readily found expression. Second, the legal position of HP and its abuses
were tested daily in the County Courts, with Scott suggesting that judges continued to
"articulate their own distinctive conception of a moral economy."-7 Neither popular
enmity nor extensive judicial opinion was evident with respect to check trading. The
Voment Group on Public Weifare argued that "the public at large know next ro norhing
of that vast installment purchase organization, the clothing clubs."'8 Provident's effective
use of the agency system minimized legal costs and shielded business practices from
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unpredictable judicial scrut iny. Consequently, i t  proudly claimed in 1938 that i ts use of
the County Courts for debt recovery was "praoically nil,"ro and there is no significant
record of action against the cor.r.rpany by disgruntled retailers. Equally there is no record
of high levels of consumer dissatisfaction with check trading. What is certain is that
reform of check trading never captured the public imagination as had HP
This privileged existence was interrupted during the 1939-45 war. Desirous ro con-
trol consumer expenditure and possible circumvention of maximum price orders, and
possessing drafts of Ottr Tbwns anda communiqud fiom James Mallon ofToynbee Hallt" ,
the Board ofTiade suspended poundage payments in October 1942, effectiveiv granting
borrowers zero interest on checks. sr Check traders were also forced ro accept lower dis-
counts from retailers, averaging 12%o. Several companies unsuccessfully attempted to
evade regulation by reducing repaymenr schedules, introducing penalry charges and by
encouraging agents to work freelance, strategies proscribed by subsequent Orders.8: Af-
ter substantial pressure, including support from the National Union of Distributive and
Allied Workers who represented many agenrs, poundage was resrored in January 1949 at
the higher rate of 1 shilling 8 pence in the pound (APR = 37.3o/o), reduced to I shilling
and 6 pence in August 1950 (APR = 33.9o/o) for the remainder olr the period under
examination. Minutes of rneetings with the Board of Trade reveal that the latter was
Llnsympathetic rowards check traders, particularly restorarion of poundage ar pre-war
leveis.sr Its eventual reintroduction was undoubtedly motivated by recognition of the
necessiry of credit for working class consumers and a desire to avoid driving check cus-
tomers towards more expensive crec'lit bargains, such as those offered by moneylenders.
These fears persisted into the 1950s: a 1953 Liverpool pol ice report conducted for the
Board of Tiade concluded that the withdrawal of check trading would harm trade and
increase monevlending, the reby creating "a fhr greater evil than that which it is alleged is
afForded by systen.rs of check trading."s'i
Freedom from regulation does not appear ro have conf-erred any demonstrable ad-
vantage after the w:rr. Although Proviclent's business gradually returned to prewar levels,
growing affluence under full employment and new patterns of retailing saw orher modes
of credit such as HP and mail order develop substantially greater markets. Mail order
retailers were the check tradert gre:rtest posrwar rivals. The HP market grew appreciably
through the 1950s and 1l960s.85 L.r addition, smaller check traders, such as Cattle Hoid-
ings, which sought market share by oflering more generous terms or better discounts,
increasinglv contested Provider-rt's dominance.s(' Provident'.s response ro comperirion was
to radically reorganize the business in 1962. It became a public limited company and
began issuing vouchers - a higher value variant of the check (often issued for specific
purchases or retailers) repayable over longer periods and intended ro compere with HP
However, sir-rce the 1970s, Provident has gradually transformed itself ir-rto a convenrional
moneylending business that is the subject of regular cr i t ic ism.st
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Conclusion
Check trading, and by association the Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd.,
have enjoyed a subterranean existence in the history of consumer credit in the UK. But
however duli by comparison with the iconic consumer goods available berween the t 920s
and 1960s, check trading played a more significant role in the everyday consumprion
choices of many low-income households. A eulogy read at Joshua Waddilove's funeral
observed that "he went into business and stuck to business: not for the sake offun but for
the sake of money" to pursue his philanthropic ambitions.88 In this he was certainly
successful, since his enterprise grew to cover the country and attracted over one million
regular customers. The system he devised was simple and undoubtedly more easily com-
prehended than many other forms of credit. The company's modus operandi careful
screening ofcreditworthiness, diligent collection and avoidance ofthe courts - helped it
successfully evade scrutir-ry and regulation, so that criticism never coalesced to become a
cause t'y'\?bre.
Ultimately, check trading must b€ evaluated in terms of its costs for working class
communit ies, including the costs of avai lable alternatives. There is no doubt that the
sums cxtracted from borrowers and retailers were significant. Check trading also embod-
ied the potential to generate indirect costs for consumers through higher prices at parrici-
pating shops and inferior goods requiring more frequent replacement. It is obvious that
the welfare of Provident'.s customers could have been improved had the system's costs
been lower. The check tradet non-market costs, such as the pressure to renew loans and
n.rake repayments in order to retain credirworthiness, should also be acknowledged. But
one need not fully subscribe to a model of consumer rationality to believe that Provider.rt'.s
customers tacitly ur-rderstood the costs and benefits of using checks. The choice of one
form ofcredit over anothcr is conringent upon several factors in addit ion to the cost of
capital, including the furure availability of credit, the quality of goods purchasable and
the perceived economic and social risks of each method of borrowing. These factors were
reasonably transparent with respect to check trading. Considering the total attributes of
the check trade credit bargain, it is possible to argue that it was at least as good as the next
best alternatives (shop credit, moneylenders, pawnbrokers, HP), and in many respecrs
superior, while in no way excusing the defects of the system. Saving and thrift, as extolled
by the 'Women's Group on Public Weifarese, simply denied the nvin realities of low,
irregular or inadequate incomes and the increasing calls of burgeoning consumer sociery
upon the working class {'amily's pocket book. As Joshua Sf'addilove told the Daily Mailin
1908, many working class households found it difTicult to "leave the shilling unrouched."'  r0
Ulrimately, the check trade appealed to a sizeable yet iimited group of working class
consumers. The market had stagnated by the late-1950s as the extension of the banking
services to working class households, reform of the HP business, the perceived conve-
nience of mail order and increasing affluence began to constrain the market for low value
checks. Provident began the transformation of the business in 1962 by becoming a pub-
lic limited company and developing the vouchers trade. Its subseqr.rent move into direct
moneylending using the agency system for weekly collection excluded retailers from the
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system and transferred the entire cost of borrowing onto consumers at considerably higher
rates of interest. While it is unwise to directly compare the historical check trade with the
current home collected credit business, it is interesting to observe the robustness ofJoshua
Waddilove'.s original business model and reflect upon the continued need for such ser-
vices and the continuing debates, berween free market and interventionist ideologies,
that the system has fostered.
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